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"Live Free" or Regulate?
Considering A, B and their Dispute
Resolution Clause Regarding Blackacre
By Jean R. Sternlight
Aand B enter into a dispute resolution agreementpertaining to Blackacre, that parcel of landso often the subject of law school discussions.
Should courts or regulators enforce the clause as A and
B have written it, void part of their agreement or add
more requirements? Absent regulation, is there reason to
believe this agreement would be just?
The dispute resolution field is split on these issues.
While many of us are attracted to the free-spirit or
even libertarian idea that
disputants should design
processes that best suit
their needs, others fear
that unregulated dispute
resolution processes may
lead to unjust results. For
example, should A and B be
permitted to use any neu-
tral they wish, even if the
neutral lacks any commonly
accepted credentials or
experience with a respected
dispute resolution group?
(Such lack of credentialing
is the norm in many parts of
the United States.) Should A
As we consider these issues, we might want to think
of the dispute resolution field as a marketplace,' one
in which A and B may be viewed as shoppers choosing
among various dispute resolution products and services.
A and B presumably will take into account their own
preferences, the costs of the alternative processes (e.g. in
money, time and emotion) and the prospective benefits
of those processes (e.g. in terms of likely result, money,
reputation, emotion, future relationships and furtherance
While many of us are attracted to
the free-spirit or even libertarian
idea that disputants should design
processes that best suit their
needs, others fear that unregulated
dispute resolution processes may
lead to unjust results.
and B be permitted to use
a process some disapprove of, such as so-called evaluative
mediation or party-appointed non-neutral arbitration?
Should the neutral A and B selected be required to
disclose information not requested by them? Should B be
allowed to use a form contract to require A to agree to
pre-dispute binding arbitration?
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of justice). In this model,
the "sellers" of mediation,
arbitration and even per-
haps judicial dispute resolu-
tion services compete to
be selected by disputants.2
Although the government
does not actually sell
dispute resolution services,
except through a heavily
subsidized filing fee, at least
some court administrators
and judges aspire to provide
services that will be attrac-
tive to disputants.
Those who believe
strongly in the benefits of free markets may suggest that
regulation is not needed, because A and B will knowingly
select a particular form of mediation, arbitration or other
process that meets their needs and reject those forms of
dispute resolution that they perceive to be too costly,
slow, biased or unfair. Such free-market advocates claim
that competition between sellers of dispute resolution
services will ensure that prices fall to a minimum and
that the interests of A and B are well served.
The marketplace analogy, however, is imperfect. First,
one purported "seller," the government, may actually pre-
fer that disputants resolve their disputes privately so that
the government need not subsidize litigation.' Second,
instead of a single buyer choosing a dispute resolution
process, this "market" features multiple disputants who
may have different preferences but must agree on a com-
mon product. Yet despite these limits, the marketplace
analogy is still useful as we contemplate whether and
when to regulate A's and B's choice of dispute resolution
processes. While traditional economists are often seen as
advocates of limited regu-
lation, relying instead on
Adam Smith's "invisible Perfect competitic
hand" to ensure fairness
and prosperity, the field of buyers possess p
economics can also help us information ab
understand when regula-
tion is appropriate due products and se
to the absence of perfect
competition.' Adding choose produc
psychology to economics, avoid produc
as is done in the new field
of behavioral economics,c
provides even more help-
ful insights. We will also see that the need for regulation
depends upon the identity and circumstances of the
mysterious A and B.
Limitations of Free Markets Justify Regulation
Lack of Perfect In formation
Perfect competition exists only when buyers possess
perfect or complete information about the available
products and services, so they can choose products they
want and avoid products they do not. Yet we know that
consumers of dispute resolution services may no be so
well informed. If A is Archie Homeowner entering into a
small-print form contract with Bezillion Bank, we cannot
assume that Archie possesses or can acquire anything
close to complete information. Archie may not know
what mediation and arbitration are nor understand how
they relate to litigation. He may not realize that in agree-
ing to binding arbitration, he is relinquishing any right to
a jury trial or, depending on the language of the clause,
likely giving up any right he might have had to partici-
pate in a class action. He may not know that a dispute
resolution provider has an improperly close relationship
with some of the disputants for whom the practitioner
supposedly provides neutral dispute resolution services. In
these kinds of circumstances, we cannot count on perfect
competition to protect Archie's interests and may instead







On the other hand, if A and B are the Allied
Renovation Company and Builder Inc., two large com-
panies, we can reasonably assume they are more knowl-
edgeable about the nature of dispute resolution. We can
better trust such parties to knowingly select a particular
form of mediation, arbitration or other process that meets
their need and to reject those forms of dispute resolution
that they perceive to be too costly, slow, biased or unfair.
Thus, the case for regulation is weaker.
Yet even sophisticated users of dispute resolution
services may not have perfect information. They may not
understand how neutrals are selected, how discovery or
appeals are handled in arbitration or how confidentiality
plays out in mediation
or arbitration. Moreover,
exists only when even knowledgeable
consumers of dispute
rfect or complete resolution services are
utalso affected by cognitiveJt th avaiableframeworks that may dis-
ices, so they can courage them from seeking
out all the information
they want and they might need. For
3 they do not. example, because we tend
to be overly optimistic
about the future, we will
typically discount the
likelihood that a dispute will occur at all, and therefore
often pay inadequate attention to the fact that we may
end up involved in one.6
In sum, the case for regulation is strongest when the
parties to a dispute resolution agreement are most likely
to lack perfect information. In such cases, we may want
to regulate to provide better access to information or,
when that is not likely to succeed, to directly regulate the
quality of dispute resolution processes.
Impacts of Parties' Dispute Resolution Clauses
on Non-parties
The unregulated market can work perfectly only when
the choices of buyers and sellers exclusively impact those
buyers and sellers. When, by contrast, A's and B's dispute
resolution choices may positively or negatively impact
other parties indirectly, regulation may be needed. For
example, if Archie Homeowner and Builder Inc. choose
to litigate the issue of whether the material used in con-
structing Blackacre causes cancer, their choice to litigate
may provide a public good. If the dispute goes to trial,
Jean Sternlight is the Saltman Professor and
Director of the Saltman Center for Conflict
Resolution at UNLV. She may be contacted at
Jean.sternlight@unlv.edu or http://www.law.unlv.
edu/faculty/jean-sternlight.html.
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and especially if it is appealed, it will create precedent,
and the availability of this precedent may help others
resolve their similar disputes more efficiently.
Resolutions reached in mediation or arbitration can
sometimes also benefit non-parties. For example, Archie
Homeowner and Bezillion Bank might settle a dispute
over Archie's mortgage in mediation, and this settlement
might require or inspire the bank or even other banks to
change their loan practices. Or an arbitrator's decision
to require Archie Tenant to vacate the premises of
Blackacre might greatly improve the morale of neighbors
who had been putting up with a prostitution ring Archie
had been running out of his home.
Just as private parties' resolution of their disputes can
benefit non-parties, so can private parties' use of dispute
resolution processes impose burdens on non-parties.
If Archie Homeowner is raising pigs on Blackacre, an
arbitration clause that results in a decision allowing him
to continue that operation will have negative olfactory
implications for the entire area. Similarly, if Builder
Inc. prevents Archie Homeowner from bringing a class
action claim regarding the lead paint used in Blackacre
and other properties, this will potentially harm not only
Archie but other homeowners and tenants who might
have benefitted from that claim. In fact, the Texas
Supreme Court found that the adult child of a home pur-
chaser could not bring a personal injury claim against the
builder because her father had entered into an arbitration
clause with that builder.'
Yet the unregulated free market does not take
account of additional costs or benefits imposed on non-
parties. To the extent we
believe that the dispute
resolution agreements
between A and B per- [Elconomics t
taining to Blackacre may driven providers o
implicate the interests
of non-parties, we have services will always
a societal interest in
regulating those agree-
ments, and we may want
to prohibit parties from
entering into dispute
resolution agreements that would deprive the public
of important precedents. Or we may want to proscribe
certain kinds of dispute resolution agreements that we
think might be harmful to society - because, for example,
they eliminate the option of class actions.
Inequality of Initial Resources
Even a perfectly competitive market cannot
ameliorate an initial unequal distribution of resources.
If Archie Homeowner believes that Bezillion Bank
committed fraud with respect to the mortgage for




that claim, whether in litigation, arbitration or even
in mediation. Should society decide that allowing
Archie or others to bring such a claim is desirable, it
may need to step in to regulate or subsidize the dispute
resolution process. Unregulated, dispute resolution
processes will often help the rich get richer while the
poor get poorer. Consider for example Bernal v. Burnett,
in which a number of students in online, for-profit
technical schools and colleges sought to litigate fraud
and consumer protection claims against those schools,
only to be told that an arbitration clause precluded
them from joining together in a class action.' As Marc
Galanter noted many years ago, the more powerful
"repeat players" are well positioned to do better than
"single player" disputants in any context.' Thus we
may want to prevent wealthy companies or individuals
from using dispute resolution clauses to take advantage
of less wealthy members of society by eliminating jury
trials, class actions, or punitive or compensatory dam-
ages. We might even regulate dispute resolution clauses
to try to begin to equalize resources by, for example,
requiring companies to submit to binding arbitration
when consumers select arbitration."
Beware the Race to the Bottom
If consumers of dispute resolution services cannot pro-
tect themselves, do we necessarily need to turn to gov-
ernment regulation for protection? Some will urge that
we should trust dispute resolution providers to do the
right thing, because they are good and fair and because
they are interested in protecting their own reputations.
Yet economics teaches
that profit-driven pro-
viders of dispute resolu-
aches that profit- tion services will always
dispute resolution at least be tempted to
cater to powerful repeat
at least be tempted players, to the detriment
ul repeat players. of less knowledgeable
consumers. Though
some providers may be
reputable and ethical,
companies may be
tempted to retain other, less reputable ones. If the market
cannot be relied upon to regulate itself and if the govern-
ment does not step in, there is nothing to prevent this
race to the bottom. Had the Minnesota attorney general
not sued the National Arbitration Forum for fraud and
deceptive practices, the NAF would likely still be pur-
porting to provide neutral services to debt collectors with
whom it was intertwined."
When Regulation is Least Needed
An economic and psychological analysis of the market
for dispute resolution also provides insights for when
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If the market cannot be relied upon to regulate itself and if the government does
not step in, there is nothing to prevent this race to the bottom.
regulation is least needed. Sometimes the features of
a particular dispute make it reasonably likely that the
market will effectively regulate itself and ensure that
any dispute resolution clause entered into will be fair.
Specifically, when two or more sophisticated users of
dispute resolution services, with fairly equal resources,
knowingly want to enter into an agreement that will have
little impact on others, there is little need to fear market
imperfections and thus little need to prevent them from
entering that agreement. Thus, if Allied Renovation
Company and Builder Inc. want to enter a dispute resolu-
tion agreement regarding problems that might occur
during the renovation of Blackacre, we should not worry
much about issues such as the credentials of the neutrals
they select or the precise form of the dispute resolution
process they choose.
Conclusion
Understanding some of the purposes of regulation -
to protect people who lack sufficient information to
protect themselves; to protect the interests of non-
parties; and, at times, to redistribute resources that are
distributed inequitably - can help us to work toward
better and more just regulation of the dispute resolution
field. These same factors can help us decide what regula-
tion is needed. Not all regulations are good or sensible,
just as not all regulation is bad or unnecessary. Rather, by
thinking about the underlying economics and psychology
and by considering the nature of the specific parties and
issues involved in a likely dispute, we can come up with
better solutions for when and how dispute resolution
should be regulated. *
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